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Katz: Contracts--Offer and Acceptance--Qualification
and Request in Acc
NOTES

STUDENT

CONTRACTS-On-MR

AND ACCEPTANCE-QUALIFICATIONS

AND RE-

QUESTS IN ACCEPTANCE.-Every court recognizes the following
fundamental principles of contract law. An acceptance of an offer
must be unequivocal, must comply with the terms of the offer, and
must not be so qualified or conditioned as to amount to a counter
offer. Added terms requested as a favor do not invalidate an acceptance. Conditions in an acceptance which do not qualify in legal
effect'the offer do not impair the acceptance. 2
As general principles of law the rules as laid down seem simple
and accurate. When actual situations are presented to the courts,
however, these rules may sometimes be merely convenient tools of
discretionary construction.
When does the court recognize an acceptance as qualified?
When does the court declare it to be a counter-offer? When is a
statement construed as a mere request, hope or suggestion? It is
not often easy to decide. It is not often an easy matter for a
court to determine whether the acceptance is not rendered ambiguous or conditional by uniting with it an expression of hope
or suggestion that some unimportant modification be made in its
terms. Sometimes the fact situation presents features of a counter
offer or qualification and also of a request or suggestion. That
the courts, in construing, are influenced by surrounding circumstances is apparent. Often but little weight is given to the rules
themselves. It is the purpose of this note to collect our West
Virginia cases on this subject and to examine a few of them.
In Iron Works v. Construction ,Company,s plaintiff offered to
sell defendant certain materials for building purposes. In his letter
of reply defendant stated his understanding to be that the offer
included rivets and bucking irons. The court held that as he had
manifested his acceptance this was only a hope or suggestion.
This case seems arguable to say the least. To purport an acceptance and then say you understand rivets and bucking irons will
be sent seems to amount to a condition that if not sent this will
not amount to an acceptance of the offer. Williston has this to
say, "It seems clear that if before a contract is finally concluded
the parties become aware that they are insisting on different con4
structions of their duties thereunder, no contract will arise."'
Circumstances evidently had much to do in leading the court to
I WILISTON, CONTRACTS, Vol. 1, §§ 72 to 77. Also the RESTATME T Or
THE LAW Or CONTRACTS, American Law Institute, §§ 58 to 64.
2 bid, §§ 78, 79, WI.LISTON.
386 W. Va. 173, 102 S. E. 860 (1920); also cited in CORNELL L. QuA.
Supp. § 62.
4WILLISToN, CONTRACTS, VOl. 1, § 78.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1930], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

hold a good contract here. There had been correspondence extending over a long period of time; plaintiff, a company furnishing
building materials, had materially changed its position in reliance
upon the defendant, even depriving itself of selling to others. To
have held no binding contract would certainly have produced an
inequitable result. This is a striking example of the influence of
surrounding circumstances.
Some cases are quite clear. In Bowers Company v. Kanawha
Valley Products Company5 there was an offer to let the lessor of
a certain gas and oil lease have one-eighth of thirty-six per cent
of the gasoline produced for the privilege of so producing said
gasoline. A telegram was sent by the lessor which purported to
suggest an agreement at one-eighth of the total amount of gasoline
produced. This reply was held to be a counter offer.
In Allen v. Simmons6 the P accepted the order and added, "contingent upon strikes, car shortage, etc. Board of trade weight
final." Held: Qualified acceptance, so therefore no binding contract.
In Turner v. McCormick7 the offeree wrote, "I hereby accept
according to your terms and request you to make delivery of deed
to me, with abstract of title, in Morgantown on June 28, 1902."
The court held this to be a mere request, therefore a binding contract was created.
In Wheeling, Ohio and Eastern Railroad Company v. Wheeling
Coal Railroad Company' the agreement contained this provision,
"Written notice of acceptance must be given the optionors." The
court held that a verbal acceptance made no binding contract.
However, this is not always true. Williston, in his treatise on
Contracts, 9 says that care must be taken, however, in construing
offers, to make sure whether the offer imposes an absolute condition
as to time, place and manner of acceptance, or merely suggests
a method which will be satisfactory to the offeror. It is frequently necessary to look beyond the literal meaning of the
language used.
Other West Virginia cases collected on the subject of request
100 W. Va. 278, 130 S. E. 284 (1925).
e 97 W. Va. 318, 125 S. E. 86 (1924).
756 W. Va. 161, 49 S. E. 367 (1904).
894 W. Va. 536, 119 S. E. 551 (1923).
9W
sToN, CONTRAcTS, vol. 1, § 76.
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and qualification in the acceptance of offers are noted below.1
Many questions often arise regarding the termination of offers.
We must carefully note that there is a marked difference in the
qualification of an acceptance and the terminating of an offer.
In the cases considered thus far there has either been a contract
or the rejection of the offer. It is important to note that a mere
request does not terminate the offer.
In the case of Bowers Company v. Kanawha Valley Products
Company" the court presented a point in the syllabus which could
apply only to the case decided. The law as therein expressed
cannot be accepted as a general rule of law regarding the termination of offers. The syllabus reads, "Request for change or modification of proposed contract, made before acceptance, amounts to a
rejection thereof."
If we follow this view we are lead to the conclusion that if an offeree merely requests a change in the terms
of the offer his chances to accept later are. gone. This is not the
prevailing view. Section 36 of the Restatement of the Law of
'Contracts' has this provision, "An offer is rejected when the
cfferor is justified in inferring from the words or conduct of the
offeree that the offeree intends not to accept the offer or to give
it further consideration." So a mere request for a change in the
contract may not justify the offeror in inferring a rejection of
the offer. Under the heading "Comment" in Section 38 of the
Restatement"" we find that "a counter-offer must be distinguished
from a mere inquiry regarding the possibility of different terms,
a request for a better offer, or a comment upon the terms of the
offer." For example, A offers to sell Blackacre to B for $5000.
B replies, "Won't you take less?" To which A answers "No!"
10 Electric Co. v. Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 347, 112 S. E 587 (1922) where
words "January 10" were inserted in place "as soonn as possible"; Whitaker,
Glessner v. Clark, 98 W. Va. 19, 126 S. E. 340 (1925) where acceptance sent
to place other than residence of offeror; Pollack v. Brookover, 60 W. Va.
75, 53 'S.E. 795 (1906), where a fail re to comply in respect to payment;
Devine v. Silson, 63 W. Va. 409, 60 S. E. 351 (1907), counter-offer of 2%
in place of offer of 5% rate; Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 8 S. E. 743
(1888) ; Morris v. Risk, 86 W. Va. 30, 102 S. E. 725 (1920) and cases cited
therein.
11 Supra; n. 5.
12R ESTATEMENT
TUTE, § 36.

OF THE LAw OF CONTRACTS, The

American

LAw INSTI-

13 Ibid, § 38.
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An acceptance thereafter by B, if within a reasonable time (or
the time specified) creates a binding contract. 4 Following the law
as presented in the Restatement we can see that the statement
by the West Virginia court is entirely too general. A mere
request for a change in the terms of the offer will not prevent a
later acceptance as the court broadly indicates it would.
-JEROME

KATZ.

2414id, example cited therein.
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